We implement two versions of a simple but illustrative smart contract: one in Solidity on the Ethereum blockchain platform, and one in Plutus on the Cardano platform, giving annotated code excerpts, with full source code also attached. We get a clearer view of the Cardano programming model in particular by introducing a simple but novel mathematical abstraction which we call Idealised Cardano (or more precisely, Idealised EUTxO). For each version of the contract, we trace how the architectures of the underlying platforms and their mathematics affects the natural programming styles and natural classes of errors. We prove some simple but novel results about alpha-conversion and observational equivalence for Cardano, and explain why Ethereum does not have them. We conclude with a wide-ranging and detailed discussion in the light of the examples, mathematical model, and mathematical results so far.
Introduction
In the context of blockchain and cryptocurrencies, smart contracts are a way to make the blockchain programmable. That is: a smart contract is a program that runs on the blockchain to extend its capabilities.
For the smart contract, the blockchain is just an abstract machine (database, if we prefer) with which it programmatically interacts. Basic design choices in the blockchain's design can affect the the smart contract programming paradigm which it naturally supports, and this can have far-reaching consequences: different programming paradigms are susceptible to different programming styles, and different kinds of program errors.
Thus, a decision in the blockchain's design can have lasting, unavoidable, and critical effects on its programmability. It is worth being very aware of how this can play out, not least because almost by definition, applications of smartcontracts-the-programming-paradigm tend to be safety-critical.
In this paper we will consider a simple but illustrative example of a smart contract: a fungible tradable token issued by an issuer who creates an initial supply and then retains control of its price-imitating a government-issued fiat currency, but run from a blockchain instead of a central bank.
We will put this example in the context of two major smart contract languages: Solidity, which runs on the Ethereum blockchain, whose native token is ether ; and Plutus, which runs on the Cardano blockchain, whose native token is ada. 3 We compare and contrast the blockchains in detail and exhibit their respective smart contracts. Both contracts run, but their constructions are different, in ways that illuminate the essential natures of the respective underlying blockchains and the programming styles that they support.
We will also see that the Ethereum smart contract is arguably buggy, in a way that flows from the underlying programming paradigm of Solidity/Ethereum. So even in a simple example, the essential natures of the underlying systems are felt, and with a mission-critical impact. Definition 1.1. We will use Solidity and Plutus to code a system as follows:
1. An issuer Issuer creates some initial supply of a tradable token on the blockchain at some location in Issuer's control; call this the official portal. 2. Other parties buy the token from the official portal at a per-token ether/ada official price, controlled by the issuer. 4 Once other parties get some token, they can trade it amongst themselves (e.g. for ether/ada), independently of the official portal and on whatever terms and at whatever price they mutually agree. 3. The issuer can update the ether/ada official price of the token on the official portal, at any time. 4. For simplicity, we permit just one initial issuance of the token, though tokens can be redistributed as just described. 
CurrencySymbol is assumed to Gödel encode 8 some predicate defining a monetary policy (more on this in Remark 2.7(2)) and n ∈ TokenName is just a symbol (Ada has special status and is encoded as (0, 0)).
A value v ∈ Value is intuitively a multiset of tokens; v c is the number of cs
in v.
-We may abuse notation and define v c = 0 if c ∈ dom(v).
-If dom(v) = {c} then we may call v a singleton value (note v c need not equal 1). See line 10 of Figure 2 for the corresponding code. 5. A transaction is a set of inputs and a set of outputs. In a blockchain these are subject to consistency conditions (Definition 2.5); for now we just read a transaction left-to-right such that its inputs 'consume' some previous outputs, and 'generate' new outputs.
We need a little more notation: Definition 2.5. A valid blockchain (or just blockchain) of idealised Cardano is a finite sequence of transactions such that:
1. Distinct outputs appearing in tx have distinct positions. 2. Every input i appearing in tx points to an output in some earlier transaction. Write this unique output tx (i). 3. If i = (p, k) appears in tx and points to an earlier output tx (i) = (p, V, s, v), then (k, s, tx @i) ∈ V .
Notation 2.6. Txs will range over finite sequences of transactions, and B will range over blockchains. We write valid (Txs) for the assertion "Txs is a blockchain".
Remark 2.7. In words: A sequence of transactions is a blockchain when every input points to an earlier validating output. We call Figure 1 and Definition 2.5 Idealised Cardano because:
1. The implementation has bells and whistles which we omit for simplicity: (a) There is a second type of output for making payments to people. (b) Values represent 'real money' and so are preserved-the sum of input values must be equal to the sum of output values-unless they are not preserved, e.g. due to fees (which reduce the sum of outputs) or forging (creating) tokens (which increase it). (c) Transactions can be made time-sensitive using slot ranges (Remark 2.17); a transaction can only be accepted into a block whose slot is inside the transaction's slot range. All of the above is important for a working blockchain but for our purposes it would just add complexity. 2. We continue the discussion in Remark 2.3(3). If we consider a chip c = (d, n), the currency symbol d is not aritrary: it is (a Gödel encoding of) a monetary policy predicate. In the implementation, only transactions which satisfy all pertinent monetary policies are admissible. This is relevant to our example in Section 3 because we will assume a state chip with a monetary policy which enforces that it is affine (zero or one chips on the blockchain; see Remark 3.3). Explaining the mechanics of how this works is outside the scope of this paper; here we just note it exists. 3. In the implementation, a transaction is a pair of a set of inputs and a list of outputs. This is because an implementation concerns a run on a particular concrete blockchain B, and we want to assign concrete positions for outputs in B; so with a list the output located at the jth output of ith transaction could get position 2 i 3 j . However, we care here about the theory of blockchains (plural). It is better to use sets and leave positions abstract, since if positions are fixed by their location in a blockchain then in Theorem 2.16 and the lemmas leading up to it, when we rearrange transactions in a blockchain (e.g. proving an observational equivalence) we could have to track an explicit and messy reindexing of positions in the statement of the results. More on this in Subsection 2.3.
UTxOs and observational equivalence
We will be most interested in Proof. For part 1: removing tx cannot invalidate the conditions in Definition 2.5. For part 2: it may be that an input in Txs points to an output in tx ; if we then remove tx we would violate condition 2 of Definition 2.5 that every input must point to a previous output.
A special case of interest is when two transactions operate on non-overlapping parts of the preceding blockchain: Notation 2.11. Suppose tx and tx ′ are transactions. Write tx #tx ′ when the positions mentioned in the inputs and outputs of tx , are disjoint from those mentioned in tx ′ , and in this case call tx and tx ′ apart. Similarly for tx #Txs.
Proof. An easy structural fact. Remark 2.13. In Lemma 2.14 and Theorem 2.16 below, note that: -valid (B; tx ) (Notations 2.6 and 2.9) can be read as the assertion "it is valid to append the transaction tx to the blockchain B". -valid (B; Txs) can be read as "it is valid to extend B with Txs".
-If tx #tx ′ then they mention disjoint sets of positions, so they cannot point to one another and the UTxOs they point to are guaranteed distinct. Then either the submission of tx fails and is rejected (e.g. if some validator objects to it)-or it succeeds and tx is appended to B.
If it succeeds, then even if other transactions Txs get appended first-e.g. they were submitted by other actors whose transactions arrived first, so that in-between us creating tx and the arrival of tx at the main blockchain, it grew from B to B; Txs-then the result B; Txs; tx is up to observational equivalence equivalent to B; tx ; Txs, which is what would have happened if our tx had arrived at B instantly and before the competing transactions Txs.
In other words: if we submit tx to the blockchain, then at worst, other actors' actions might prevent tx from getting appended, however, if our transaction gets onto the blockchain somewhere, then we obtain our originally intended result up to observational equivalence. Proof. As for Theorem 2.16, noting that slot ranges are orthogonal to UTxOs, provided the transactions concerned can be appended.
α-equivalence and more on observational equivalence
Our syntax for B in Definition 2.5 is name-carrying; outputs are identified by unique markers which-while taken from N; see "Position=N"in Figure 1 -are clearly used as atoms or names to identify binding points on the blockchain, to which at most one later input may bind. Once bound this name can be thought of graphically as an edge from an output to the input that spends it, so clearly the choice of name/position-once it is bound-is irrelevant up to permuting our choices of names. This is familiar from α-equivalence in syntax, where e.g. λa.λb.ab is equivalent to λb.λa.ba. We define: 1)). 10 It is a fact that this is an equivalence relation. 2. If Φ is an assertion about blockchains, write "up to α-equivalence, Φ" for the assertion "there exist α-equivalent forms of the arguments of Φ such that Φ is true of those arguments".
Lemma 2.20 checks that observational equivalence interacts well with being a valid blockchain and appending transactions. We sketch its statement and its proof, which is by simple checking. In words it says: extensionally, a blockhain up to α-equivalence is just its UTxOs:
Remark 2.21. We need α-conversion in cases 3 and 4 of Lemma 2.20 because valid (B; tx ) might fail due to accidental name-clash between the position assigned to a spent output in B, and a position in an unspent output of tx . We need α-conversion to rename the bound position and avoid this name-clash.
This phenomenon is familiar from syntax, e.g. we know to α-convert a in (λa.b)[b:=a] to obtain (up to α-equivalence) λa ′ .a.
There are many approaches to α-conversion: graphs, de Bruijn indexes [4] , name-carrying syntax with an equivalence relation as required (used in this paper), the nominal abstract syntax of the first author and others [5] , and the type-theoretic approach in [6] . Studying what works best for a structural theory of blockchains is future research.
In this paper we have used raw name-carrying syntax, possibly quotiented by equivalence as above; a more sophisticated development might require more. Note the implementation solution discussed in Remark 2.7(3) corresponds to a de Bruijn index approach, and for our needs in this paper, this does not solve all problems, as discussed in that Remark (see 'messy reindexing'). 2. Config stores configuration: the issuer (given by a hash of their public key), the chip traded, and the state chip (see Remark 3.3). 3. tradedChip packages up n of cTradedChip in a value (think: a roll of quarters). 4. Action is a datatype which stores labels of a transition system, which in our case are either 'buy' or 'set price'. 5. State Integer corresponds to Datum in Figure 1 . stateData s on line 29 retrieves this datum and uses it as the price of the token. 6. value ' (lines 26 and 29) is the amount of ada paid to the Issuer. 11 Remark 3.3 (State chip). In Remark 2.15 we described in what sense Idealised Cardano (Figure 1 ) is stateless. Yet Definition 1.1(3) specifies that Issuer can set a price for the traded chip. This is seems stateful. How to reconcile this?
The Plutus smart contract
We create a state chip cStateChip, whose monetary policy (Remark 2.7(2)) enforces that it is affine and monotone increasing, and thus linear once created. The Issuer issues an initial transaction to the blockchain which sets up our trading system, and creates a unique UTxO that contains this state chip in its value, with the price in its Datum field.
The UTxO with the state chip corresponds to the official portal from Definition 1.1, and its state datum corresponds to the official price.
Monetary policy ensures this is now an invariant of the blockchain as it develops, and anybody can check the current price by looking up the unique UTxO distinguished by carrying precisely on cStateChip, and looking at the value in its Datum field. 12 The interested reader can consult the source code. 
The Solidity smart contract

Description
Remark 4.1. The Ethereum blockchain is account-based: it can be thought of as a state machine whose transitions modify a global state of contracts containing functions and data. We propose in Figure 3 a type presentation of Idealised Ethereum, parallel to the Idealised Cardano of Figure 1 . In brief: Datum is intended to be structured data which we Gödel encode for convenience. FunctionName and ContractName are names, which again for simplicity we encode as N. 2. A contract has a name and a finite set of functions (Notation 2.1(2) ). 3. A function has a name and maps an input to a blockchain transformer. 4. A blockchain is a finite collection of contracts, to each of which is assigned a state of a value (a balance of ether) and some structured data. We intend that a valid blockchain satisfy some consistency conditions, including that each contract in it have a distinct name.
Thus the contract Changing (line 1 of Figure 4 ), once deployed, is located on the Ethereum blockchain, with its functions and state. This contract and its state are 'in one place' on the blockchain; not spread out across multiple UTxOs as in Cardano. There is no need for the state-chip mechanism from Remark 3.3.
Remark 4.2. We now briefly read through the code:
1. address is an address for the Issuer. It is payable (it can receive ether) and public (its value can be read by any other function on the blockchain). 13 2. constructor is the function initialising the contract. It gives issuer (who triggers the contract) all the new token. 3. send is a function to send money to another address. Note that this is not in the Plutus code; this is because we got it 'for free' as part of Cardano's in-built support for currencies (this is also why Idealised Cardano has the type Value in Figure 1 ). 4. buy on line 20 is analogue to the Buy transition in Figure 2 .
Discussion
Remark 4.3. In line 21 of Figure 4 we calculate the tokens purchased using a division of value (the total sum paid) by price .
In contrast, in line 29 of Figure 2 we calculate the sum by multiplying the number of tokens by the price of each token.
There is a reason for this: we cannot perform the multiplication in the Solidity buy code because we do not actually know the price per token at the time the function acts to transition the blockchain. We can access a price at the time of invoking buy by querying Changing.price (), but by the time that invocation reaches the Ethereum blockchain and acts on it, the blockchain might have undergone transitions, and the price might have changed.
Because Ethereum is stateful and has nothing like Remark 2.15 and Theorem 2.16, this cannot be fixed.
Remark 4.4. One might counter that this could indeed be fixed, just by changing buy to include an extra parameter which is the price that the buyer expects to pay, and if this expectation is not met then the function terminates. However, the issuer controls the contract ( issuer = msg.sender on line 9 of Figure 4) , including the code for buy, so this safeguard can only exist at the issuer's discretion-and our issuer, whether through thoughtlessness or malice, has not included it.
In Cardano the buyer has more control, because by Theorem 2.16 a party issuing a transaction knows (up to observational equivalence) precisely what the inputs and outputs will be; the only question is whether it successfully attaches to the blockchain (cf. Remark 2.15 and Subsection 2.3).
Another subtle error in the Ethereum code is that the / on line 21 is integer division, so there may be a rounding error. 14 Remark 4.5. The Ethereum code contains two errors, but the emphasis of this discussion is not that it is possible to write buggy code (which is always true) rather, we draw attention to how and why the underlying accounts-based structure of Ethereum invites and provides cover for certain errors in particular.
On the other hand, the Plutus code is more complex than the Ethereum code. Plutus is arguably conceptually beautiful, but the pragmatics as currently implemented are fiddly and the amount of boilerplate required to get our Plutus contract running much exceeds that required for our Ethereum contract. This may improve as Plutus matures and libraries improve-Plutus was streamlined as this paper was written, in at least one instance because of a suggestion from this paper 15 -but it remains to be seen if the gap can be totally closed.
So Ethereum is simple, direct and alluring, but can be dangerous, whereas Plutus places higher burdens on the programmer but enjoys some good mathematical properties which can enhance programmability. This is the tradeoff.
Remark 4.6 (Contracts on the blockchain). It is convenient to call the code referred to in Figures 2 and 4 contracts, but this is in fact an imprecise use of the term: a contract is an entity on the blockchain, whereas the figures describe schemas or programs which, when invoked with parameters, attempt to push a contract onto the blockchain.
-For Plutus, each time we invoke the contract schema for some choice of values for Config, the schema tries to creates a transaction on the blockchain which generates a UTxO which carries a state-chip and an instance of the contract. The contract is encoded in the monetary policy of the state-chip (which enforces linearity once created) and in the Validator of that UTxO. The issuer's address is encoded in the Validator field of the UTxO. A mathematical presentation of the data structures concerned is in Figure 1 .
14 It would be unheard of for such elementary mistakes to slip into production code; and even if it did happen, it is hardly conceivable that such errors would happen repeatedly across a wide variety of programming languages. That was sarcasm, but the point may bear repeating: programmer error and programming language design are two sides of a single coin. 15 -the need for runGuardedStep.
-For Ethereum, Figure 4 also describes a schema which deploys a contract to the blockchain. Each time we invoke its constructor we generate a specific instance of Changing. Configuration data, given by the constructor arguments, is simply stored as values of the global state variables of that instance, such as issuer (line 2 of Figure 4 ).
Remark 4.7 (State & possible refinements). In Solidity, state is located in variables in contracts. To query a state we just query a variable in a contract of interest, e.g. price or balances in contract Changing in Figure 4 .
In Plutus, state can be more expensive. State is located in unspent outputs; see the Datum and Value fields in Output in Figure 1 . In a transaction that queries or modifies state, we consume any UTxOs containing state to which we refer, and produce new UTxOs with new state. Even if our queries are read-only, they destroy the UTxOs read and create new UTxOs. 16 Suppose a UTxO contains some very popular state information, so that multiple users simultaneously submit transactions to the blockchain, referencing it. Only one transaction can succeed and be appended and the other transactions will not link to the new state UTxO which is generated-even if it contains the same state data as the older version. Instead, the other transactions will fail, because the particular incarnation of the state UTxO to which they happened to link, has been consumed.
This could become a bottleneck. In the specific case of our Plutus contract, it could become a victim of its own success if our token is purchased with high enough frequency, since access to the state UTxO and the tokens on it could become contested and slow and expensive in user's time. The state UTxO becomes, in effect, constantly locked by competing users-though note the the blockchain would still be behaving correctly in the sense that nobody can lose tokens.
For a more scaleable scenario, some library for parallel redundancy with a monetary policy for the state chip(s) implementing a consensus or merging algorithm, might be required. This is future work.
One more small refinement: every token ever bought must go through the contract at the official price-even if it is the issuer trying to withdraw it (recall from Definition 1.1(4) that we allow only one issuance). In practice, the issuer might want to code a way to get their tokens out without having to go through buy.
Remark 4.8 (Resisting DOS attacks). An aside contrasting how Cardano and Ethereum manage fees to prevent denial-of-service (DOS) attacks: In Cardano, users add transactions to the blockchain for a fee of a + bx where a and b are constants and x is the size of the transaction in bytes. This prevents DOS attacks because e.g. if we flood the blockchain with n transactions containing tiny balances, we pay ≥ na in fees. In Ethereum, storage costs a fee (denominated in gas); if we inflate balances-which is a finite but unbounded mapping from addresses to integers-with n tiny balances, we may run out of gas.
Summary of the critical points
1. The errors in the Solidity code are not necessarily obvious. 2. The errors cannot be defended against without rewriting the contract, which requires the seller's cooperation (who controls the contract and might be hostile and have planted the bug). 3. In Plutus, the buyer creates a transaction and determines its inputs and outputs. A transaction might be rejected if the available UTxOs changebut if it succeeds then the buyer knows the outcome. Thus if the user of a contract anticipates an error (or attack) then they can guard against it independently of the contract's designer. In Ethereum this is impossible: a buyer can propose a transition to the global virtual machine by calling a function on the Ethereum blockchain, but it is the designer of the contract who has designed that function-and because of concurrency, the buyer cannot know the values of the inputs to this function at the time of its execution on the blockchain.
Conclusions
We have seen that Ethereum is an accounts-based blockchain system whereas Cardano (like Bitcoin) is UTxO-based, and implemented a specification (Definition 1.1) in Solidity (Section 4) and in Plutus (Section 3), and we have given a mathematical abstraction of Cardano, idealised Cardano (Section 2). These have raised some surprisingly non-trivial points, both quite mathematical (e.g. Subsection 2.3) and more implementational (e.g. Subsection 4.2), which are discussed in the body of the paper. The accounts-based paradigm lends itself naturally to an imperative programming style: a smart contract is a program that manipulates a global state mapping global variables (called 'accounts') to values. The UTxO-based paradigm lends itself naturally to a functional programming style: the smart contract is a function that takes a UTxO-list as its input, and returns a UTxO-list as its output, with no other dependencies. See Theorem 2.16 and the preceding discussion and lemmas in Subsection 2.2 for a mathematically precise rendering of this intuition, and Subsection 2.3 for supplementary results.
Smart contract programming is naturally concurrent; the blockchain must expect to scale to thousands, if not billions, of concurrent users, 17 but the problems inherent to concurrent imperative programming are well-known and predate smart contracts by decades. This is an issue with Ethereum/Solidity and it is visible even in our simple example. Real-life examples, like the infamous DAO hack 18 , are clearly related to the problem of transactions having unexpected consequences in a stateful, concurrent environment.
Cardano's UTxO-based structure invites a functional programming paradigm, and this is reflected in Plutus. The price we pay is arguably an increase in conceptual complexity. More generally, in Remarks 4.6 and 4.7 we discussed how state is handled in Plutus and its UTxO model: further clarification of the interaction of state with UTxOs in Plutus is important future work.
In summary: accounts are easier to think about than UTxOs, and imperative programs are easier to read than functional programs-at least initially-but this ease of use makes us vulnerable to serious classes of hard-to-trace errors, especially in a concurrent safety-critical context. Such trade-offs may be familiar to many readers with a computer science or concurrency background.
We hope that this paper will provide an accessible, yet technically precise, entry point for interested readers, and serve as a guide to some of the design considerations of working in this area.
